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“Human wealth is likely to be about two-thirds of total wealth and twice
ﬁnancial wealth. This suggests that the omission of human wealth may be
a serious matter.” Campbell (1996)
I Introduction
International ﬁnance theory emphasizes the eﬀectiveness of global portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation strategies for cash-ﬂow stabilization and consumption risk sharing.1 However,
the empirical evidence on international portfolio holdings favors a widespread lack of
diversiﬁcation across countries and a systematic bias toward home country assets (see,
e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) for a recent survey). This discrepancy between the-
oretical predictions and observed portfolio constitutes the international diversiﬁcation
puzzle (see, e.g., French and Poterba (1991)). Moreover, albeit the degree of home bias
has been reducing during the last few decades, it remains a ﬁrst order characteristic of
portfolio holdings.2
In the major industrialized countries, roughly two-thirds of gross domestic product
goes to labor and only one-third to capital. Thus, human wealth likely constitutes
about two-thirds of total wealth, suggesting that if investors attempt to hedge against
adverse ﬂuctuations in returns to human capital when making ﬁnancial investment
decisions, the mere size of human capital in total wealth makes its potential impact on
portfolio holdings self-evident.
Based on this observation, several contributions have argued that when the role
of human capital is explicitly taken into account, the observed home country bias in
portfolio holdings becomes harder to rationalize. The argument, originally formalized
by Brainard and Tobin (1992) with a stylized example, works as follows: if returns
to human capital are more correlated with the domestic stock market than with the
foreign ones, labor income risk can be more eﬀectively hedged with foreign assets than
with domestic ones, and equilibrium portfolio holdings should be skewed toward foreign
securities.3 As emphasized by Cole (1988), “this result is disturbing, given the apparent
lack of international diversiﬁcation that we observe.”
1Nevertheless, the size of gains from international risk sharing continues to be a debated issue. E.g.:
Grauer and Hakansson (1987) suggest that an individual’s gains from international stock-portfolio di-
versiﬁcation are large; Cole and Obstfeld (1991) ﬁnd small gains from perfect pooling of output risks;
Obsfteld (1994) calibration exercises imply that most countries reap large steady-state welfare gains
from global ﬁnancial integration; Palacios-Huerta (2001) ﬁnds that, for a mean variance investor,
adding human capital to the deﬁnition of wealth generates substantially smaller gains from interna-
tional portfolio diversiﬁcation.
2Coeurdacier and Rey (2013, Table 1) estimate that, for a large set of countries, the 2008 portfolio
share in domestic equity is on average about 71%, with an average implied home bias (measured as
one minus the ratio of domestic equities in the domestic portfolio relative to the the domestic share in
world market capitalization) of about 70%.
3Moreover, Michaelides (2003) shows with a calibration exercise that, in the presence of liquidity
constraints, if labor income shocks are positively correlated with the domestic stock market returns
and orthogonal to foreign asset returns, investors should hold only foreign assets in their portfolios.
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However, as ﬁrst suggested in Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996), human
capital hedging could also lead toward home country bias in portfolio holdings. For
instance, the correlation between domestic return on physical and human capital can
be lowered by idiosyncratic shocks that lead to a redistribution of total income between
capital and labor. In the presence of these rent shifting shocks, foreign assets become
a less attractive hedge for labor income risk—especially if total factor productivity
shocks are highly correlated internationally. If the size of the rent shifting shocks is
large enough, a situation in which domestic assets are the best hedge against human
capital risk arises, therefore leading to home country bias in portfolio holdings.
In this paper, we ask whether the human capital hedging motive is likely to have
a sizeable eﬀect on optimal portfolio choice, and what its implications are for the
international diversiﬁcation puzzle. Moreover, we propose a rationalization of the
home country bias, based on a setting of endogenous portfolio formation and incomplete
markets, that not only can rationalize aggregate portfolio holdings, but also the variable
degree of home country bias in households’ portfolios.
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Figure 1: Locally weighted regression of the share of foreign assets, Panel (a), and the
number of stocks hold by the household, Panel (b), on the logarithm of the ﬁnancial
wealth to labor income ratio of the household. Two standard error conﬁdence bands
computed via bootstrapping. Estimation based on all the U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finances available to date (1992–2013). Year speciﬁc estimates reported in Figure A1
of the Appendix.
In particular, Figure 1 depicts a novel (to the best of our knowledge) ﬁnding about
households’ equity home bias.4 Panel (a) depicts the (locally weighted regression of
the) share of foreign assets in U.S. household portfolios as a function of the household
ﬁnancial wealth to labor income ratio. Since (labor income) ﬂows and stocks (of hu-
man capital) are cointegrated, Panel (a) show that there is a systematic relationship
4We are thankful to Laura Bottazzi and S¸ebnem Kalemli-O¨zcan for suggesting us to explore this
dimension of the data.
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between household speciﬁc home country bias and the household speciﬁc ﬁnancial to
human capital ratio: the degree of home country monotonically decreases as the human
capital component of household total wealth becomes smaller relative to the household
ﬁnancial wealth. That is, in micro data, when the human capital hedging motive is
more prominent relative to the ﬁnancial wealth hedging motive, household portfolios
show a higher degree of home country bias. Moreover, Panel (b) of Figure 1, that
depicts the (locally weighted regression of the) number of stocks in U.S. household
portfolios as a function of the household ﬁnancial wealth to labor income ratio, shows
that when the households’ human capital wealth is relative larger than the ﬁnancial
wealth, the household portfolio will tend to be overall less diversiﬁed.
Our paper provides a rationalization of both of these ﬁndings, as well as of the
aggregate home country bias, and also shows that the canonical intuition that human
capital should skew portfolio holdings toward foreign assets, and the related supporting
empirical evidence, are both very fragile. In particular, we oﬀer three main contribu-
tions.
First, using novel estimates of the correlations of human capital and stock market
return innovations, we calibrate an incomplete market model in which agents face both
idiosyncratic and aggregate labor income risk, as well as borrowing constraints.5 The
model is also calibrated to match the microeconomic (following Gourinchas and Parker
(2002)) characteristics of the U.S. labor income and track the distribution of the asset
wealth to labor income ratios observed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The main ﬁndings of this calibration exercise are that a) investors that enter the
stock market with a low levels of liquid (i.e. ﬁnancial) wealth to labor income ratio
will initially specialize in domestic assets and, b) only as the level of asset wealth to
labor income ratio increases do agents start diversifying their portfolios internationally
by progressively adding diﬀerent assets to their holdings, c) as a consequence, the
aggregate portfolio of U.S. investors shows a large degree of home bias.
What drives these results? Households face large human capital risk, but this
is mostly of the idiosyncratic type—hence underestimated in a homogeneous agent
setting. Moreover, in the presence of liquidity constraints, agents cannot borrow to
construct an optimally diversiﬁed portfolio. Therefore, when their level of liquid wealth
to labor income ratio is suﬃciently high and they enter the stock market, agents try to
minimize the overall wealth risk, investing ﬁrst in the asset that has the lowest degree
of correlation with labor income innovations—and, as discussed below, this assets is,
in the data, the domestic stock. Only when the ratio of liquid wealth to labor income
is suﬃciently high, and the labor income risk hedging motive becomes less important
relative to the ﬁnancial risk hedging one, do agents start investing in foreign assets
5We focus on household level liquidity constraint given the widespread empirical support for this
modeling assumption (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Iacoviello (2005), Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou
(2008)).
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and diversifying their portfolios internationally. Since the distribution of liquid wealth
to labor income is (in the data as in the model) concentrated in the region of low
liquid wealth to labor income ratios, the resulting aggregate portfolio is heavily skewed
toward domestic assets. Note that, in the absence of market frictions and idiosyncratic
risk, the estimated and calibrated correlations of labor income and returns innovations,
being very small, would have almost no eﬀect on the optimal portfolios.
Moreover, since in our model the aggregate home country bias depends on both
the household optimal investment policy functions and the aggregate distribution of
liquid wealth to labor income, a trend of increasing concentration of ﬁnancial wealth
(as documented by Piketty (2014)), and/or a negative trend in the labor share of
income (as documented by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)), would both generate
a negative trend in the degree of home country bias as found by Coeurdacier and Rey
(2013).6
Since the pattern of correlation of innovations to labor income and returns plays an
important role in our calibration, our second contribution hinges upon the identiﬁcation
of a common misspeciﬁcation that has aﬀected the previous empirical literature, and
the provision of novel estimates that are not aﬀected by this issue. In particular, we
show that the seminal empirical result of Baxter and Jermann (1997) that, in the
presence of a human capital hedging motive, investors should short sell the domestic
capital stock—implying that “the international diversiﬁcation puzzle is worse than
you think”—is largely due to an econometric misspeciﬁcation rejected by the data: the
assumption that there are neither cross-country shocks to human and physical capital
payoﬀs, nor common long run trends. We show that, once this restriction is relaxed, the
eﬀective degree of technological and economic integration becomes evident, therefore
reducing the opportunities to hedge human capital risk by investing in foreign assets.
Moreover, we also show that there is substantial uncertainty attached to the esti-
mation of aggregate physical capital returns via the canonical Campbell and Shiller
(1988) cum vector autoregression (VAR) approach. This feature of the data provides a
rationalization for the apparently contradictory empirical evidence on the correlation
between returns to human and physical capital found in the previous literature (that
typically has not reported conﬁdence bands for the estimated correlations): Lustig and
Nieuwerburgh (2008) ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between domestic returns to
physical and human capital in U.S. data; Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996)
ﬁnd such a correlation to be negative in all the countries they consider but the United
States, where they ﬁnd it to be strongly positive; Baxter and Jermann (1997) ﬁnd
this correlation to be positive and very close to one for all the countries they consider
6This also implies that the role of globalization and, more broadly, multinationals, for the home
country bias, cannot be evaluated without controlling for their impact on the distribution of wealth and
income. For instance, if globalization where to reduce the international diversiﬁcation opportunities,
while at the same time increasing the concentration of wealth and/or reducing the labor share of
income, its eﬀect on the home country bias would be ambiguous.
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(United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan).
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that by restricting the set of assets available to hedge human
capital to include only publicly traded stocks—what we consider as the relevant case for
most households—much sharper estimates can be obtained, and these are the estimates
used in our calibration exercise discussed above. We ﬁnd that in this case human
capital hedging can help explain the home country bias in portfolio holdings—since
domestic returns to human capital tend to be systematically more correlated with
foreign stock markets—but, we show, given the small magnitudes of the estimated
correlation, the eﬀect is quantitatively very small in a frictionless complete market
setting.7 Nevertheless, as discussed above, this same small correlations have very
large aggregate eﬀects in an incomplete market settings in which agents face both
idiosyncratic and aggregate labor income risk.
Note that, overall, our result that domestic capital markets constitute a good hedge
for domestic human capital risk are in line with the ﬁndings of a large empirical litera-
ture. Palacios-Huerta (2001) ﬁnds that if human capital is included in the deﬁnition of
wealth, gains from international ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation for a mean-variance investor
appear to be smaller than previously reported. Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) ﬁnd
that innovations in current and future human wealth returns are negatively correlated
with innovations in current and future domestic ﬁnancial asset returns. Abowd (1989)
ﬁnds a large and negative correlation between unexpected union wage changes and
unexpected changes in the stock value of the ﬁrm. Davis and Willen (2000), using
data from the PSID to construct synthetic cohorts, ﬁnd that the correlation between
domestic labor income shocks and returns on the S&P 500 is substantially negative for
some categories.8 Moreover, they ﬁnd that for six out of the eight sex-education groups
considered in their study, a long position on the worker’s own industry represents a
good hedge for labor income risk. The empirical works of Gali (1999), Rotemberg
(2003), and Francis and Ramsey (2004) also document a negative correlation between
labor hours and productivity conditioning on productivity shocks. Coeurdacier and
Rey (2013), conditioning on exchange rate movements, ﬁnd that wages and dividends
growth rates commove negatively for all the country they consider (also Coeurdacier,
Kollmann, and Martin (2010) and Heathcote and Perri (2013) provide similar empirical
evidence).
Third, we show that, theoretically, a situation in which labor income innovations
are more correlated with the domestic payout to capital than the foreign ones—as we
ﬁnd in the data—is likely to arise once the degree of international economic integration
7This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Fama and Schwert (1977).
8Davis and Willen (2000) generally ﬁnd that the degree of correlation between earning shocks and
equity returns rises with education, with a lower bound correlation of -0.25 for men who did not ﬁnish
high school. This is in line with empirical studies on the labor demand in modern economies that
consistently ﬁnd that more educated workers are relatively complementary to physical capital and the
use of advanced technologies.
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observed in the data is properly taken into account. In particular, we show that very
small redistributive shocks (shocks with a variance that is equal to as little as 6%-11%
of the output variance), are enough to make the domestic equity market the best hedge
for human capital risk. And this result arises even in a setting in which, in the absence
of small redistributive shocks, payoﬀs to domestic human and physical capital would
be perfectly correlated.
The analysis presented in this paper is part of, and complementary to, the literature
that has attempted to explain home bias as a hedge against non-tradable risks.9 More-
over, the potential rationalization of the international diversiﬁcation puzzle we docu-
ment in this paper should be interpreted as complementary, rather than alternative, to
the ones based on transaction and information frictions (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009), Bhamra, Coeurdacier, and Guibaud (forthcoming)), nominal sticki-
ness (e.g., Engel and Matsumoto (2009)), non-traded goods (e.g., Heathcote and Perri
(2013)) and more broadly the role of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations (e.g., Coeurdacier
(2009), Kollmann (2006), Baxter, Jermann, and King (1998b)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a calibrated
model of human capital risk hedging in which households face both idiosyncratic and
aggregate labor income risk, as well as liquidity constraints. Section III presents the
empirical approach undertaken to measure factor returns and rationalizes the diﬀerence
in results between our ﬁndings and the previous empirical literature. Section IV shows
how very small rent shifting shocks can make the domestic equity the best hedge for
human capital risk when the degree of international correlations in GDP movements
is taken into account. The ﬁnal section outlines the conclusions of the paper, while a
detailed data description, as well as additional results, are reported in the Appendix.
II Portfolio Choice with Heterogeneous Human Capital
Risk and Liquidity Constraints
In this section we rely on numerical methods to compute the equilibrium outcome of
a model that directly takes into account that i) most of the human capital risk faced
by households is idiosyncratic in nature, and ii) households’ optimal portfolio choice
is inﬂuenced by liquidity constraints. The simple incomplete markets model presented
below is a generalization of Heaton and Lucas (1997) to a multiple asset context and
of Michaelides (2003), and builds upon the household income process estimate by
Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
9See, e.g., Eldor, Pines, and Schwarz (1988), Stockman and Dellas (1989), Tesar (1993), Baxter,
Jermann, and King (1998a), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001), Serrat (2001), and Pesenti and van Wincoop
(2002).
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II.1 Model Setup and Calibration
Each household solves the problem
max{
Ct,Bt,Sdt ,{Sjt}Nt=1
}E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
1− γ
subject to the short selling constraints Bt, S
d
t , S
j
t ≥ 0 for all t and j, the period budget
constraint
Ct +Bt + S
d
t +
J∑
j=1
Sjt ≤ RftBt−1 +RdtSdt−1 +
J∑
j=1
RjtS
j
t−1 + Yt, (1)
and the standard transversality condition, where 1 > β > 0 is the time discount factor
(calibrated at the value of 0.95 per year), γ is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
(calibrated at the benchmark value of 3), Ct is consumption, Bt is the dollar amount
invested in domestic bonds, Sdt is the amount invested in the domestic stock, S
j
t is the
amount invested in the stock of country j, Yt denotes the labor income, R
f is the gross
risk free rate, Rdt is the gross return on the domestic stock, and R
j
t is the return on the
stock of country j.
In order to model aggregate labor income (Y g) dynamics in a parsimonious manner,
we searched for a low dimensional ARIMA representation and selected (see Appendix
A.3 for details) an MA(2) speciﬁcation for its log growth rate:
gt+1 = log
Y gt+1
Y gt
= μy + εt+1 + θ1εt + θ2εt−1 (2)
where εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
. The individual labor income of agent i is assumed to follow the
process
Y it = Y
g
t W
i
tU
i
t (3)
W it = GW
i
t−1N
i
t (4)
where U it is independent of ε, N , and asset returns, and logU
i
t ∼ N
(−12σ2u, σ2u) so
that E
[
U it
]
= 1, logW it evolves as a random walk with drift, logN
i
t ∼ N
(−12σ2n, σ2n),
so that E
[
N it
]
= 1, and N is independent of ε and asset returns. This speciﬁcation
corresponds to Gourinchas and Parker (2002) except for the added term Y gt that reﬂects
aggregate economic uncertainty.10 Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimates,
we calibrate σu = 0.073 and σn = 0.105, and we calibrate σε, θ1, θ2, and μy using
the point estimates in Table A3 in Appendix A.3. This calibration implies that the
aggregate labor risk component has a standard deviation that is of a unit of magnitude
10Gourinchas and Parker (2002) also add a small positive probability for U = 0, therefore allowing
the labor income to be zero with positive probability.
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smaller than the ones of the idiosyncratic components. We assume also that log returns
on risky assets and shocks to the aggregate labor income process (ε) are jointly normal.
Given equations (2)-(4), the individual labor income growth is given by
Δ log Y it = gt + logG+ logN
i
t +Δ logU
i
t
and requires the normalization logG = 12
(
σ2u + σ
2
n
)
in order to recover the aggregate
labor income growth rate as an average of the individual labor income growth rates.
The model implies the following Euler equations
C−γt = βR
fEt
[
C−γt+1
]
+ λB
C−γt = βEt
[
C−γt+1R
d
t+1
]
+ λd
C−γt = βEt
[
C−γt+1R
j
t+1
]
+ λj ∀j
where λB, λd, and λj are the Lagrange multipliers on the short selling constraints for
domestic bonds, domestic stocks, and foreign stocks. Let Xt be the cash on hand at
the beginning of period t
Xt = R
fBt−1 +RdtS
d
t−1 +
J∑
j=1
RjtS
j
t−1 + Yt.
Since the utility function implies that there is no satiation in consumption, the budget
constraint will hold with equality and
Ct = Xt − 1{Bt>0}Bt − 1{Sdt >0}S
d
t −
J∑
j=1
1{Sjt>0}S
i
t (5)
where 1{.} is an index function that takes value 1 if the condition in brackets is satisﬁed
and zero otherwise. To solve the model, we make the problem stationary dividing all
the variables at time t by
Zit := Et
[
Y it+2
]
= G2W itY
g
t exp [(θ1 + θ2) εt + θ2εt−1 + k]
where k = 2μy +
[
1 + (1 + θ1)
2
]
σ2ε
2 . Note also that
log
Zit+1
Zit
= μy + (1 + θ1 + θ2) εt+1 + logG+ logN
i
t+1
Using Equation (5) and the homogeneity of degree −γ of the marginal utility, we
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can rewrite the Euler equations as⎛⎝xt − bt − sdt − J∑
j=1
sjt
⎞⎠−γ = max
⎧⎨⎩
⎛⎝xt − sdt − J∑
j=1
sjt
⎞⎠−γ ;βRfEt
[
c−γt+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−γ]⎫⎬⎭
⎛⎝xt − bt − sdt − J∑
j=1
sjt
⎞⎠−γ = max
⎧⎨⎩
⎛⎝xt − bt − J∑
j=1
sjt
⎞⎠−γ ;βEt
[
Rdt+1c
−γ
t+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−γ]⎫⎬⎭
⎛⎝xt − bt − sdt − J∑
j=1
sjt
⎞⎠−γ = max
⎧⎨⎩
⎛⎝xt − bt − sdt − J∑
j=1,j =j′
sjt
⎞⎠−γ ; βEt
[
Rj
′
t+1c
−γ
t+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−γ]}
∀j′ = 1, ...J
where small font letters represent the ratios of the capitalized variables to the normal-
izing variable Z (e.g., c := C/Z), and the normalized state variable x (see, e.g., Deaton
(1991) and Carroll (2009)) evolves according to
xt =
⎛⎝Rfbt−1 +Rdt sdt−1 + J∑
j=1
Rjts
j
t−1
⎞⎠ Zit−1
Zit
+
Y it
Zit
(6)
where
Y it
Zit
= G−2U it exp [− (θ1 + θ2) εt − θ2εt−1 − k] .
In order for the individual Euler equations to deﬁne a contraction mapping for the
normalized asset holdings optimal rules
{
b (x, ε) , sd (x, ε) , sj (x, ε)
}
, we need (following
Theorem 1 of Deaton and Laroque (1992)) that
βRft+1Et
[(
Zt+1
Zt
)−γ]
< 1
βEt
[
Rdt+1
(
Zt+1
Zt
)−γ]
< 1
βEt
[
Rit+1
(
Zt+1
Zt
)−γ]
< 1.
Given the assumptions on the primitives and the calibrated values, these conditions
hold and there exists a unique set of optimal policies satisfying the Euler equations.
To avoid the curse of dimensionality of numerical solutions and, most importantly,
in order to have suﬃciently long time series for the estimation of the variance covari-
ance matrix of labor income innovations and asset returns using the unrestricted VAR
approach presented in Section III below, we focus on four countries: the United States
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(as domestic country), the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. As we show in Sec-
tion III below, not restricting the VAR representation to have country speciﬁc block
exogeneity is both required by the data, and needed in order to undercover the true
degree of hedging potential via international diversiﬁcation.11
Since the U.S. domestic risky asset has enjoyed both the lowest variance and a high
Sharpe ratio compared to the other countries considered, and this pushes the optimal
portfolio to be skewed toward the domestic stock, we calibrate all the countries as
having the same mean return and Sharpe ratio as the United States. A summary of
the calibrated preference and labor income process parameters are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Preference and Labor Income Parameters
γ 3
β 0.95
σU 0.210
σN 0.146
μy 0.019
ϑ1 0.448
ϑ2 0.094
Mean Market Return 0.060
Market Return St. Dev. 0.175
Risk Free Rate 0.011
The crucial element in calibrating the model is the covariance structure of asset
returns and innovations to the aggregate labor income process. We measure capital
returns using broad stock market indexes and calibrate their covariance using the time
series sample analogous. The calibration of the covariance structure of aggregate labor
income shocks and stock market returns is summarized by the correlations reported
in the ﬁrst four columns of Table 2. These are based on the estimation approach
discussed extensively in Section III below, where we show that the (diﬀerent) estimates
obtained in the previous literature are due to misspeciﬁcation. The crucial element in
Table 2 is that the correlation between U.S. labor income innovations (fourth column)
with the domestic stock market is marginally smaller than the ones with foreign stock
markets returns (expressed in dollar terms). Note that these correlations are all small
in magnitude and, as shown in Table A5, would have a very small eﬀect on the optimal
portfolio choice in a complete markets setting.
As a benchmark, the last column of Table 2 reports the implied optimal portfolio
shares of the domestic portfolio absent any human capital hedging motive and shows
that, according to the estimated covariance structure of returns, the share of U.S. assets
in the U.S. domestic portfolio would be about 25% in the absence of aggregate labor
11Note also that, according to the 2012 World Bank data, these four countries alone account for
more than half of the world total market capitalization of listed companies.
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Table 2: Market Returns and Aggregate Labor Income Shock Correlations
Correlations Implied market
Germany Japan U.K. Aggregate labor portfolio w.o. labor
income shocks income risk
U.S. 0.57 0.32 0.72 0.04 25%
Germany 0.46 0.51 0.14 22%
Japan 0.41 0.19 36%
U.K. 0.15 18%
income risk.
II.2 Investors’ Optimal Policy Rules and Portfolio Choice
Having calibrated the model, we can estimate the optimal policy function by standard
numerical dynamic programming techniques (see, e.g., Carroll (1992) and Haliassos
and Michaelides (2002)) to compute the optimal consumption and asset holding rules.
Since the time t optimal policy rules depend both on the normalized cash on hand and
on the last labor income shock (εt−1), we numerically integrate out this last variable
to have policy rules as a function of the cash on hand only,12 obtaining the investment
rules
{
b (x) , sd (x) , si (x)
}
. Moreover, from Equation (5) we can obtain the optimal
consumption rule c (x).
Optimal policy rules are plotted, as a function of normalized cash-on-hand, in
Figure 2. Not surprisingly, the optimal consumption policy rule has the same shape
as in the buﬀer stock saving literature, with consumption being equal to cash on hand
(no saving region) until a target level of cash on hand is reached and saving starts
taking place. Once the saving region is reached, the consumers specialize in stocks,
disregarding bonds. This result, well know in the literature, was originally obtained
by Heaton and Lucas (1997) in a domestic portfolio choice settings, and it reﬂects the
implication of the large equity premium for the optimal portfolio choice.
More interestingly, when the consumer enters the saving region, she initially invests
only in the domestic stocks and only gradually diversiﬁes her portfolio internationally
as the level of cash-on-hand increases. This happens for three reasons. First, only a
small buﬀer stock saving is needed for the agent to protect herself from future labor
income shocks. Second, when entering the saving region, the agent prefers to invest
in the assets that have the smallest correlation with labor income shocks, in order not
to increase her overall level of risk correlated with income. This is due to the fact
12Optimal policy functions do not seem to change signiﬁcantly as a function of past aggregate labor
income shocks, mainly due to the very small variance of these shocks compared to the idiosyncratic
ones. In particular, policy functions computed assuming a plus or minus two standard deviation shock
in aggregate labor income are almost identical to the ones obtained after integrating out this variable.
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Figure 2: Optimal consumption and investment policy functions as a function of nor-
malized cash-on-hand.
that, when entering the investment region, almost the entirety of the agent’s wealth
is in the form of human capital. Hence, for relatively low levels of cash-on-hand,
the human capital hedging motive dominates the portfolio diversiﬁcation motive. As a
consequence, the order in which the agents start investing in the diﬀerent stock markets
closely match the inverse rank of the correlations between labor income innovations
and asset returns. Third, only for very high levels of liquid wealth to labor income
ratio (high x) does the ﬁnancial portfolio diversiﬁcation motive become more important
than the labor income hedging one, and the agent starts diversifying fully her portfolio.
This is due to the fact that, as x increases, so does the non-human capital component
of the household wealth, therefore reducing the human capital hedging motive.
Comparing this result with the empirical distribution of cash-on-hand in the PSID
data set, less than 1% percent of the population should be investing positive amounts
in all four of the assets considered. Moreover, given the positive correlation between
normalized cash-on-hand and asset wealth observed in the data, the results imply
that only the richest households will be diversifying their portfolio internationally,
coherently with the empirical evidence on households’ portfolio holdings at the micro
level (see, e.g., Jappelli, Julliard, and Pagano (2001)).
Using the estimated policy functions, we can compute the optimal portfolio shares
as a function of cash-on-hand. These optimal shares are reported in Figure 3. The ﬁg-
ure shows a large bias toward domestic assets in all the relevant ranges of standardized
cash on hand, implying that more than 99% of the households should have an asset
12
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Figure 3: Optimal portfolio shares as a function of normalized cash-on-hand.
portfolio strongly biased toward domestic assets. Compared with the optimal share
of domestic assets in the market portfolios without aggregate labor income risk (25%
in Table 2), this represents a home country bias of individual portfolios that ranges
from 75% to 19%. Even investors in the top 1% of the distribution of cash-on-hand
observed in the data would have, on average, more than 50% of their asset wealth
invested in domestic stocks. Interestingly, this large eﬀect is generated by extremely
small diﬀerences in the correlations between labor income shocks and market returns
across countries, and a very small aggregate labor income risk component. Moreover,
as shown by the counterfactual calibration results in Appendix A.6, this eﬀect is mostly
driven by the ordering, rather than the magnitudes, of the correlations between labor
income innovations and stock market returns. This implies that small shocks that lower
the correlation between labor income innovations and market returns at the country
level can generate, in the presence of short selling constraints and buﬀer-stock saving
behavior, a very large degree of domestic bias in portfolio holdings.
II.3 Implications for the Aggregate Portfolio
This subsection derives the implications of the optimal investment rules, obtained in
the previous subsection, for the aggregate portfolio of U.S. investors.
The standardized cash-on-hand in Equation (6) follows a renewal process and can be
shown to have an associated invariant distribution,13 and this can be used to compute
13See, e.g., Deaton and Laroque (1992), Carroll (1997), Szeidl (2013), and Carroll (2004).
13
the implied aggregate portfolio of U.S. investors. Moreover, given the estimated policy
functions, the aggregate portfolio can also be computed using the observed empirical
distribution of cash-on-hand.
The implied model distribution can be computed in two diﬀerent ways. First,
conditioning on a given value for the lagged aggregate labor income shock (εt−1), we
can use the policy functions and Equation (6) to compute, by repeated simulation over
a grid of values, the transition probabilities from one level of cash-on-hand to the other
Tlm = Pr (x = l|x = m) .
Given the matrix T of transition probabilities, the probability of each state is updated
by
πl,t+1 =
∑
m
Tlmπm,t.
Therefore, the invariant distribution π can be found as the normalized eigenvector of
T corresponding to the unit eigenvalue by solving(
T − I 1
1′ 0
)(
π
0
)
=
(
0
1
)
where I is the identity matrix and 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension. Since
this procedure produces invariant distributions conditioned on the lagged aggregate
labor income shock (εt−1), we can integrate out the conditioning variable to obtain the
unconditional model distribution of x.
Second, we can alternatively draw random initial levels of x to reproduce the initial
heterogeneity in wealth among agents, and then simulate dynamically the evolution
of normalized cash-on-hand over time, generating what we refer to as the dynamic
distribution of the model. We perform both procedures since the ﬁrst one requires ﬁxing
ex-ante the relevant range of x while the second one instead determines the relevant
range autonomously, therefore providing a robustness check of the construction of the
model ergodic distribution.
Figure 4 reports the distributions of normalized cash-on-hand implied by the model
and the observed distribution of normalized cash-on-hand in the PSID data.14 The
model seems to reproduce fairly well the location of the mode and the shape of the
right tail of the empirical distribution, but the model distribution is much less con-
centrated than the data around the boundary between the saving and the no saving
zone, implying a higher participation rate in the market than what is observed in the
PSID data, probably due to the absence of stock market entry costs in the set up of
the model.
14The PSID data contain accurate information on wealth holding of households at ﬁve-year intervals
since 1984. Moreover, the PSID provides weights to map the data to a nationally representative sample.
A description of the data is provided in the Appendix.
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Sa
m
pl
e
Normalized Cash−on−Hand
 
 
Model Distribution
Empirical Distribution
Figure 4: Model implied and empirical invariant distributions.
With these distributions at hand, we can compute the implied aggregate portfolio
shares of U.S. investors. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports, as a benchmark com-
parison, the CAPM market portfolio implied by the calibrated covariance structure of
returns in the absence of labor income risk. The implied aggregate portfolio shares
of the model are reported in the second column. There is a dramatic eﬀect of labor
income risk on the aggregate portfolio with about 95% of the market portfolio invested
in domestic assets. Moreover, the relative investments in foreign stocks are strongly
aﬀected, with a reduction of the portfolio shares in individual foreign stocks moving
from the 18%–36% range to the 0%–4% range.
Table 3: Aggregate Portfolio Shares of U.S. Investors with Liquidity Constraints
No Human Model Weighted Model Empirical Weighted Empirical
Capital Risk Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
U.S. 25% 95% 75% 75% 61%
Germany 22% 1% 7% 8% 13%
Japan 36% 4% 17% 17% 26%
U.K. 18% 0% 1% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Since agents with diﬀerent levels of normalized cash-on-hand are likely to have dif-
ferent amounts of wealth invested in the stock market, the simple computation of the
aggregate portfolio reported in column two of Table 3 could be a poor approximation
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of the aggregate portfolio. To address this issue, the third column of Table 4 weights
the model distribution by the contribution to the aggregate portfolio of agents having
diﬀerent levels of cash-on-hand. This weighting of the distribution also corrects for
the fact that the model implies a higher degree of market participation than what is
observed in the data. The weights are constructed from the PSID data and are pro-
portional to the total stock market holdings of households belonging to each category
of normalized cash-on-hand.
This weighting somehow reduces the degree of home bias relative to column two,
but still delivers a portfolio share of domestic stocks of about 75%, implying that
hedging human capital increases the portfolio share of domestic stocks by as much
as 50% and decreases the portfolio shares of German, Japanese, and U.K. stocks by,
respectively, 15%, 19% and 17%.
The last two columns of Table 3 show that our main result also holds if we compute
the aggregate portfolios using the empirical (again, for PSID data), rather than the
model implied, distribution of cash-on-hand, with (column ﬁve) and without (column
four) weighting. The aggregate portfolio shares implied by the empirical distribution
are, in both cases, quite similar to the ones obtained by weighting the model distribu-
tion (column three) and carry the same message: the human capital hedging motive
generates a very large home country bias, with an increase of the portfolio shares of
domestic assets between 36% and 50%.
But what is the key mechanism delivering a large home bias generated by the model
in Table 3? The driving force of our results is that small diﬀerences in the correlation
of aggregate labor income innovations and market returns, in the presence of short-
selling constraints, lead to a gradual international diversiﬁcation of investors’ portfolio
as their level of normalized cash-on-hand increases.
In the presence of liquidity constraints, agents cannot borrow to construct an opti-
mally diversiﬁed portfolio. Therefore, when their level of liquid wealth to labor income
ratio is suﬃciently high and they enter the stock market, agents try to minimize the
overall wealth risk, investing ﬁrst in the assets that have the lower degree of correlation
with labor income. Only when the ratio of liquid wealth to labor income is suﬃciently
high and the labor income risk hedging motive becomes less important relative to the
ﬁnancial risk hedging motive do agents start diversifying their portfolios.
Since the distribution of liquid wealth to labor income is—in the data as in the
model—concentrated in the region of low liquid wealth to labor income ratios, the
resulting aggregate portfolio is heavily skewed toward the asset with the lowest corre-
lation with aggregate labor income shocks.
This implies that domestic shocks that lead to a redistribution of total income
between capital and labor, therefore lowering the correlation between return on phys-
ical and human capital, are likely to skew portfolio holdings toward domestic assets.
Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996), using a VAR approach that once again im-
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poses block exogeneity across countries (and hence, as discussed in the next sections, is
likely to overestimate the beneﬁts of international portfolio diversiﬁcation), ﬁnd that
the correlations of returns to human capital with domestic market returns is smaller
than the one with foreign market returns in 7 out of 10 countries in their study (with an
average diﬀerence of 0.19). Therefore, the human capital hedging motive, once market
frictions and idiosyncratic labor income risk are taken into account, is likely to explain
a large fraction of the home country bias in several countries.
Note also that the above results have been obtained without considering the ex-
change rate risk connected with the investment in foreign assets. In the sample period
considered, the lower bound on the estimated standard deviation of exchange rates in
the three countries considered is about one-third of the standard deviation of market
returns. Moreover, the exchange rates show a weakly positive correlation with the
stock market of the foreign country and seem to be uncorrelated with the U.S. stock
market and with labor income innovations.15 Therefore, adding exchange rate risk to
the model would reduce the Sharpe ratio of foreign assets, making foreign investment
less attractive and increasing the degree of home bias.
III Measuring Factor Returns
To assess the role of human capital in determining optimal portfolio choice, and in
particular to estimate the correlation between human and physical capital innovations,
one needs to study the time series properties of the returns to human and physical
capital. This task is complicated by the fact that neither the market value nor the re-
turns to human and (total) physical capital are observable. Nevertheless, total payouts
to both factors of production are directly observable from national accounting ﬁgures.
Moreover, total payouts to the labor force and capital holders can be thought of as the
aggregate dividends ﬂows on the unobserved stocks of human and physical capitals.
We can therefore use the Campbell and Shiller (1988) methodology to infer the time
series properties of unobserved aggregate returns from the observed growth rates of
dividends on human and physical capital.
Let P and D be respectively the (unobserved) price and (observed) dividend of an
asset. The gross (unobserved) return R is given by the following accounting identity:
Rt+1 :=
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
. (7)
Assuming that the price-dividend ratio is stationary, we can log-linearize Equation (7)
around its long-run average to get:
rt+1 = (1− ρ) k + ρ (pt+1 − dt+1)− (pt − dt) + Δdt+1,
15Hau and Rey (2006) ﬁnd that, at higher frequencies, higher returns in the home equity market
relative to the foreign equity market are associated with a home currency depreciation.
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where rt := logRt, pt := logPt, dt := logDt, Δdt := dt−dt−1, ρ := 1/
(
1 + exp(d− p)),
d− p is the long-run average log dividend-price ratio, and k is a constant.
Rearranging the above equation and iterating forward, the log price-dividend ratio
can be written (disregarding a constant term) as
pt − dt =
∞∑
τ=1
ρτ−1 [Δdt+τ − rt+τ ] + lim
T→∞
ρT (pt+T − dt+T ) . (8)
The equality between the observed log price-dividend ratio, pt − dt, and future divi-
dend growth rates, Δdt+τ , and returns, rt+τ , in Equation (8) holds for any realization
of
{
Δlet+τ − reh,t+τ
}∞
τ=1
and p∞ − l∞, and hence holds in expectation for any prob-
ability measure. This implies that we can take expectations of Equation (8) under
both the time t and time t + 1 information sets. Therefore, if we follow Campbell
and Shiller (1988) in assuming that the expected one period ahead return is con-
stant, Et[rt+1] =: r¯, and also impose that the transversality condition holds,
16 i.e.,
limT→∞ ρT (pt+T − dt+T ) = 0, we have that
rt+1 − r¯ =
∞∑
τ=1
ρτ−1 (Et+1 − Et) [Δdt+τ ] (9)
where (Et+1 − Et) [x] := Et+1 [x] − Et [x] and Eτ is the rational expectation operator
conditional on the information set available up to time τ . Equation (9) implies that,
interpreting the total payouts to labor force and capital holders as the aggregate divi-
dend ﬂows on the unobserved stocks of human and physical capital, we can construct
the time series of unobserved returns on human and physical capital as a function of
(expected) future growth rates of labor income and capital dividends. The time se-
ries of returns constructed in this fashion can then be used to estimate the relevant
moments for optimal portfolio choice and human capital hedging.
To make the above approach operational, we need to construct empirical proxies
of the expected values in Equation (9). We perform this task following Campbell and
Shiller (1988) and use linear projections generated by a reduced form VAR in a similar
fashion as in the seminal work of Baxter and Jermann (1997).
In order to make our results directly comparable with Baxter and Jermann (1997)
(and, as discussed below, due to data limitations), we focus on four countries—the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan17—and the variables in-
cluded in our VAR are the labor and capital incomes in each of these countries. But,
diﬀerently from Baxter and Jermann, our empirical procedure allows for common in-
16Imposing that the transversality condition holds is less restrictive than it might seem since, even
though it rules out intrinsic bubbles as the ones analyzed in Froot and Obstfeld (1991), it does not rule
out the presence of mispricings in the asset markets (Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Brunnermeier
and Julliard (2008)).
17Baxter and Jermann (1997) focus on this sample since they estimate the cumulative share of these
four countries in the world portfolio to be around 93%.
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ternational shocks, comovements, and trends among countries and, as show in Section
III.1, this diﬀerence leads to a sharp diﬀerence in results. In particular, the econometric
speciﬁcation used by Baxter and Jermann (1997) relies on the block exogeneity of each
country in a VAR framework. Their procedure of estimating a vector error correction
model (VECM), a particular case of VAR, separately for each of the four countries
is analogous to estimating a VECM for all the countries under the assumption that
each country is block exogenous with respect to the other countries. This approach
embeds the assumption of low international economic integration. Their VECM, for
each country i, takes the form:[
ΔdiL,t+1
ΔdiK,t+1
]
=
[
ciL
ciK
]
+
[
ψiLL(L) ψ
i
LK(L)
ψiKL(L) ψ
i
KK(L)
][
ΔdiL,t
ΔdiK,t
]
+
[
ηiL
ηiK
] (
diL,t − diK,t
)
+
[
εiL
εiK
]
(10)
where diL,t denotes the log of labor income, d
i
K,t denotes the log of capital income, c
i
L
and ciK are constant terms, Δd
i
L,t+1 ≡ diL,t+1 − diL,t, ΔdiK,t+1 ≡ diK,t+1 − diK,t, and
the ψ..(L) terms are polynomials in the lag operator L. The rationale for imposing a
cointegration vector of the form [1,−1] is that if labor and capital income are allowed
to have independent trends (whether deterministic or stochastic), the labor share of
income within a country will reach 1 or 0 with probability 1 as the sample size goes
to inﬁnity. Section A.2 of the Appendix reports a formal empirical analysis of this
assumption.
Equation (10) can be rewritten in more compact form as:
ΔDit+1 = C
i +Ψi(L)ΔDit +Π
i
(
diL,t − diK,t
)
+ νit+1 (11)
where
ΔDit+1 =
[
ΔdiL,t+1
ΔdiK,t+1
]
, Ci =
[
ciL
ciK
]
, Ψi(L) =
[
ψiLL(L) ψ
i
LK(L)
ψiKL(L) ψ
i
KK(L)
]
,
Πi =
[
ηiL
ηiK
]
,νit+1 =
[
εiL
εiK
]
.
Using this notation and deﬁning ΔDt+1 and C as the vectors containing ΔD
i
t+1 and C
i
for each of the four countries considered, the VECM estimated by Baxter and Jermann
(1997) can be rewritten as a system of the form
ΔDt+1 = C+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ψ1(L) 0 0 0
0 Ψ2(L) 0 0
0 0 Ψ3(L) 0
0 0 0 Ψ4(L)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ΔDt+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Π1
(
d1L,t − d1K,t
)
Π2
(
d2L,t − d2K,t
)
Π3
(
d3L,t − d3K,t
)
Π4
(
d4L,t − d4K,t
)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ν1t+1
ν2t+1
ν3t+1
ν4t+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(12)
19
where the 0 elements are 2× 2 matrices of zeros.
There are two important implicit restrictions in Equation (12). First, the ﬁrst
matrix on the right-hand side of the equation has all the oﬀ-diagonal matrices restricted
to be zero, i.e., each country is assumed to be block exogenous with respect to the other
countries: the ﬁrst diﬀerences of log labor and log capital income of each country are
not supposed to Granger-cause the ﬁrst diﬀerences of log labor and log capital income
in other countries. Second, the cointegration structure in the second term on the right-
hand side of Equation (12) rules out cross-country cointegrations between incomes of
the factors of production—that is, it rules out international common trends (e.g., it
rules out that capital income in diﬀerent countries follows the same long-run stochastic
trend). Our empirical analysis in the next subsection relaxes both of these restrictions
and considers a more general class of VAR models for labor and capital incomes that
allow for short- and long-run comovements across countries.
III.1 Empirical Evidence: A Reappraisal
We estimate Equations (9) and (12), as well as alternative VAR speciﬁcations, using
annual data on labor income and capital income from OECD National Accounts for
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States over the period 1960-
2012. Our measure of labor income is total employee compensation. This is a less than
ideal measure in that it is likely to contain components that are not purely compen-
sation to labour (e.g. the wage bill received by an entrepreneur might contain capital
compensation components), and consequently the literature has developed more accu-
rate measures of compensation to labor (see, e.g., Gopinath, Kalemli-O¨zcan, Karabar-
bounis, and Villegas-Sanchez (2015)). Nevertheless, using more accurate measures of
wage compensation would require focusing on much shorter time series: depending on
the approach, we would lose between 39 and 75 per cent of the time series dimension,
and in such a reduced sample it would not be feasible to test for block exogeneity since
the number of parameters to be estimated would be too large relative to the number
of observations. Similarly, we are constrained to use a relatively small cross-section
of countries (that, nevertheless, account more than half of the world equity market
capitalization at the end of our sample, and more than 90% of the world capitalization
at the beginning of the sample), since expanding to more countries would not only
substantially increase the number of parameters to be estimated in each equation of
the VAR system,18 but also shorten the available time series since the countries we
consider are exactly the ones with the longest available history of wage bill data. This
data limitation, nevertheless, has the advantage of making our results directly compa-
rable to the previous literature and, in particular, to Baxter and Jermann (1997) since
18E.g., adding even only one country to our setting would imply, in the best speciﬁcation case of
Table 5 below, estimating an additional 23 parameters – i.e. a dramatic reduction in degrees of freedom
given the size of the time series dimension of the data (52 years of annual observations).
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we use exactly the same set of countries and deﬁnition of the wage bill.
Our baseline measure of capital income is GDP at factor cost minus employee
compensation. A detailed description of the dataset is given in Appendix A.1.
III.1.1 Model Selection
The restrictions imposed in Equation (12) by Baxter and Jermann (1997) can be for-
mally tested against more general speciﬁcations that allow for international comove-
ments in the payoﬀs to the factor of production. We start by assessing whether the
block exogeneity assumption is supported by the data. Table 4 reports frequentist
tests of the null hypothesis of block exogeneity in Equation (12). Both restricted and
unrestricted speciﬁcations are estimated with only one lag (as in Baxter and Jermann
(1997)), and we maintain the hypothesis of cointegration relationships only within
the countries as in Equation (12). As stressed by the p-values reported under the test
statistics, the null hypothesis of block exogeneity is rejected at any standard conﬁdence
level. That is, the data suggest that there exist statistically signiﬁcant cross-country
links between the compensations of the factors of production.
Table 4: Testing Block Exogeneity
Test Statistic
Likelihood Ratio 83.7
(0.001)
Wald 91.8
(0.000)
Lagrange Multiplier 71.2
(0.016)
Note: Tests for the block exogeneity restriction for the VECM in Equation (12). p-value of not rejecting
the null hypothesis is in brackets.
Next, we want to relax the hypothesis of only within countries cointegration rela-
tionships. That is, we want to allow for cross-country common trends across variables.
Since any possible VECM representation of the data would have a one-to-one mapping
to a corresponding VAR model in levels of log labor and capital income, we do so
by considering this last class of models. In comparing VARs in levels against other
speciﬁcations, we need to be careful about the unit roots in the labor and capital in-
come series.19 As a consequence, we perform model comparison employing Bayesian
posterior probabilities (see, e.g., Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995)) since this
approach is robust to non-stationarity in the data. In particular, for each model j
considered, we compute the Bayes factor
BFj =
∫
Θj
gj(θ)pj(X | θ)dθ (13)
19The unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for all the data series considered.
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where pj(X | θ) is the likelihood function of the data, X, θ is a vector of parameters
belonging to the space Θj , and gj(θ) is a prior on the distribution of the parameters
of the j-th model. Using the Laplace method (see, e.g., Schervish (1995)) the Bayes
factor can be approximated as
BFj ∼= gj(θ̂j)p(X | θ̂j)(2π)m2
∣∣∣Σˆθj∣∣∣ 12 (14)
where pj(X | θ̂j) is the likelihood of the j model evaluated at its peak θ̂j , m is the
dimension of Θj , and Σˆθj is the observed information matrix. Note that the above
approximation is accurate even in the presence of unit roots (see, e.g., Kim (1994)).
With the Bayes factors at hand, the posterior probability of each model j is com-
puted as
POj =
pjBFj∑
i piBFi
(15)
where pj is the prior probability of the j-th model.
Table 5 reports the logs of the Bayes factor and the posterior probabilities deﬁned
by Equations (14) and (15) for a large set of models, under the assumption of ﬂat priors
and equal prior probability for each model. The models considered are: i) vector error
correction models—with (row 1) and without (row 2) block exogeneity restrictions—in
which, as in Baxter and Jermann (1997), the only cointegrations allowed are within
country and the ﬁxed cointegration vector has the form [1,−1]; ii) VARs in levels with
the block exogeneity restriction which relax the assumption of having a cointegration
vector of the form [1,−1] (rows 3 and 4); iii) VARs in ﬁrst diﬀerences (with, row 5,
and without, row 6, block exogeneity) which rule out any form of cointegration among
variables; iv) unrestricted VARs in levels (rows 7 and 8) that allow for international
comovements and arbitrary cross-countries—as well as within country—cointegration
relationships. The maximum number of lags considered for each speciﬁcation is nat-
urally restricted by the sample size at hand, but nevertheless corresponds to the one
chosen by Akaike and Bayesian information criteria.
The econometric model considered in row 1 of Table 5 corresponds to the orig-
inal Baxter and Jermann (1997) speciﬁcation. The second row shows that relaxing
the block exogeneity assumption leads to a dramatic increase in the log Bayes factor
(logBFi). This increase is so large that if the models in the ﬁrst two rows were the only
ones considered, we would assign a posterior probability of about one to the speciﬁca-
tion that—unlike Baxter and Jermann—allows for international comovements among
variables. That is, Bayesian testing conﬁrms the strong rejection of the block exo-
geneity assumptions delivered by frequentist testing presented in Table 4. The models
considered in the third and fourth rows maintain the block exogeneity assumption but,
by considering VARs in levels, do not restrict the within country cointegration vector
to take the form [−1, 1]. The Bayes factors of these speciﬁcations are of similar mag-
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Table 5: Log Bayes Factors and Posterior Probabilities
Row Speciﬁcation logBFj POj
(1) VECM with block exogeneity, do-
mestic cointegration, one lag
724.35 1.26e− 51
(2) VECM without block exogeneity,
domestic cointegration, one lag
790.15 4.76e− 23
(3) VAR in levels with block exogeneity,
one lag
701.22 1.14e− 61
(4) VAR in levels with block exogeneity,
two lags
725.06 2.63e− 51
(5) VAR in ﬁrst-diﬀerences with block
exogeneity, one lag
717.51 1.38e− 54
(6) VAR in ﬁrst-diﬀerences without
block exogeneity, one lag
781.58 9.02e− 27
(7) VAR in levels without block exo-
geneity, one lag
769.23 3.91e− 32
(8) VAR in levels without block exo-
geneity, two lags
841.55 1
Note: Logs of Bayes factors and posterior probabilities. The posterior probabilities do not sum up to
1 because of rounding error.
nitude to the one in the ﬁrst row, but much smaller than the one in the second row,
providing additional evidence of a strong rejection of the block exogeneity assumption.
The VARs in ﬁrst diﬀerences with and without block exogeneity in rows 5 and 6 are
relevant because they impose the restriction of no cointegration among variables. Since
the Bayes factor in row 5 is smaller than the one in row 1, and the one in row 6 is
smaller than the one in row 2, the data provide supporting evidence for within country
cointegration in the payoﬀs to physical and human capital. Nevertheless, in Section
A.2 of the Appendix, we report a detailed frequentist analysis of within country cointe-
gration and ﬁnd mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis: the [−1, 1] cointegration
vector is always rejected except for Japan, while relaxing this parameter restriction the
results vary from country to country and with the lag length considered.
Finally, the speciﬁcation in rows 7 and 8 of Table 5 are unrestricted VARs in
levels with one and two lags, respectively. These speciﬁcations allow for arbitrary
cointegration within and, most importantly, across countries—that is, the variables are
allowed to show both short- and long-run systematic comovements across countries.
The speciﬁcation with two lags (which can be mapped into a VECM) in row 8 delivers
a Bayes factor that is substantially higher compared to all the other models considered.
This large Bayes factor maps into a posterior probability (POj in the second column
of Table 5) that is numerically indistinguishable from 1. That is, the data provide
strong evidence of both short- and long-run cross-country comovements in the payoﬀs
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to human and physical capital, implying that the econometric model of Baxter and
Jermann (1997)—that rules out both of these channels—is misspeciﬁed.
To test the robustness of the above results, we use numerical integration of Equation
(13) (we used an importance sampling approach based on the asymptotic Normal-
inverse-Wishart shape of the posterior to perform this task) to get alternative estimates
of the Bayes factors and posterior probabilities in Table 5. We also experimented with
non-ﬂat priors over the parameters space. In both cases, the results are in line with
the ones in Table 5.
Overall, the results of this subsection imply that to accurately measure returns to
human and physical capital, and their implications for international portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation, we should use an econometric speciﬁcation that, diﬀerently from the ones used
in the previous literature, allows for both short- and long-run international comove-
ments in the payoﬀs to production factors.
III.1.2 The Correlation of Human and Physical Capital Returns
In order to compute estimate factor returns using Equation (9) and the selected VAR
model, we calibrate the parameters ρ to 0.957 for both capital and labor income. This
corresponds to assuming that the mean dividend price ratio of labor income and capital
income are identical and equal to 4.5% as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). Moreover,
note that ﬁniteness of the empirical estimate of the right-hand side of Equation (9) is
guaranteed if ρ times the largest eigenvalue of the companion matrix of the selected
VAR model is within the unit circle. This condition is satisﬁed by our choice of ρ.
Table 6 reports the correlations between returns on capital and labor computed
using Equation (9) and the estimations of expected Δd’s by the VAR in levels speciﬁ-
cation with two lags.
The correlations are both qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent from the ones
derived by Baxter and Jermann (1997). The within countries correlations seem to be
somewhat lower compared to Baxter and Jermann (1997): their estimates cover the
range [0.78, 0.99], while our estimates have a maximum of 0.96 and a minimum of 0.67
in Japan.20
The between countries correlations appear to be higher compared to Baxter and
Jermann (1997): their maximum correlation between returns on capital is 0.43 (U.S.-
Germany), the maximum correlation between returns on labor is 0.35 (U.S.-Germany),
the maximum correlation between domestic labor returns and foreign capital returns
is 0.40 (Germany-U.S.).
In our estimation, the between countries correlations for both rL and rK are much
higher (with the exception of Japan, where the correlations between labor returns and
20Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) estimate a negative correlation between wage rate and
domestic proﬁt rate. Their estimations are much more in line with the within country correlations
reported in Table 3 than with the ones reported by Baxter and Jermann (1997).
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Table 6: Correlation of Factor Returns
rGK r
J
L r
J
K r
UK
L r
UK
K r
USA
L r
USA
K
rGL 0.761
[0.3,0.94]
0.701
[0.2,0.94]
0.828
[0.59,0.97]
0.727
[0.26,0.95]
0.747
[0.28,0.94]
0.847
[0.55,0.97]
0.808
[0.42,0.96]
rGK 0.144
[−0.55,0.73]
0.725
[0.14,0.95]
0.869
[0.55,0.99]
0.986
[0.95,1]
0.933
[0.76,0.99]
0.977
[0.92,1]
rJL 0.666
[0.15,0.93]
0.155
[−0.53,0.77]
0.170
[−0.52,0.74]
0.311
[−0.4,0.83]
0.239
[−0.48,0.78]
rJK 0.524
[−0.11,0.93]
0.751
[0.2,0.96]
0.738
[0.27,0.97]
0.739
[0.22,0.96]
rUKL 0.861
[0.55,0.99]
0.945
[0.8,0.99]
0.918
[0.73,0.99]
rUKK 0.933
[0.77,0.99]
0.982
[0.94,1]
rUSAL 0.964
[0.87,0.99]
Note: Correlations of human capital returns with physical capital returns. Factor returns are estimated
using a VAR speciﬁcation in levels with two lags. We report in brackets the 95% conﬁdence interval
constructed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based on 10,000 replications.
foreign returns on both capital and labor are generally lower). The correlations between
returns on capital, for example, cover the range [0.73, 0.98]. Moreover, for all countries
but Japan, the correlations between domestic returns on labor and foreign returns on
capital are similar to the correlation between domestic returns on labor and capital.
These results suggest the presence of productivity shocks eﬀective at the international
levels.
The factor returns that we obtain by applying Equation (9) are generated regressors
(Oxley and McAleer (1993)). To account for this, we compute the standard errors of
the corresponding correlation matrix using a bootstrap approach to statistical inference
(see, e.g., Efron and Tibshirani (1993)). More speciﬁcally, we apply a sampling-with-
replacement raw residuals bootstrap scheme with 10,000 repetitions. Interestingly, as
shown in Table 6, we ﬁnd large empirical conﬁdence intervals. For Japan, the con-
ﬁdence intervals indicate that the correlation between factor returns may be either
positive or negative. In other words, we document the existence of substantial statis-
tical uncertainty on measuring returns to the aggregate capital stock.
The diﬀerences between our point estimates and the results of Baxter and Jer-
mann (1997) are mostly driven by the relaxation of the block exogeneity assumption,
which turns out to be strongly rejected by the data. Baxter and Jermann (1997) ﬁt
a model where they restrict the countries not to be economically and technologically
integrated. As an outcome, the level of between countries correlation is underesti-
mated and the within country correlation is overestimated (i.e., the countries appear
not to be integrated). Once this restriction is removed, the eﬀective degree of tech-
nological and economic integration becomes evident. This high degree of economic
integration implies fewer opportunities to hedge the human capital risk investing in
foreign marketable assets.
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For comparability, in Table A5 of Appendix A.5, we replicate the optimal portfolio
implied by the complete spanning approach of Baxter and Jermann (1997). That is,
we replicate the authors’ main result, but correct the VAR misspeciﬁcation. Raw
point estimates in the table implicates that the authors original claim, that the home
country bias is generally worsened by the human capital hedging motive since, the table
shows, for some countries we obtain the opposite eﬀect as Bottazzi, Pesenti and van
Wincoop (1996). On the other hand, conﬁdence intervals show that there is substantial
uncertainty about optimal portfolio, and that human capital hedging can potentially
generate large home country bias. This ﬁnding also reconciles the discrepancy between
the optimal portfolios estimated in Baxter and Jermann (1997), and Bottazzi, Pesenti,
and van Wincoop (1996).
III.1.3 The Correlation of Human Capital and Stock Market Returns
Estimating returns to physical capital using the approach in Equation (9) might be
inappropriate for evaluating international portfolio diversiﬁcation, since i) only a subset
of the claims to capital compensation in a country are tradable internationally with
relatively little frictions—i.e., the ones of publicly traded companies, and ii) due to
tax advantages, the compensation to capital elicited from national accounts tends to
include de facto components of human capital compensation (e.g., for family owned
and individual ﬁrms). As a consequence, a more appropriate measure of the (relevant
for hedging purposes) correlation between human capital compensation and physical
capital ones can be constructed replacing the VAR based estimates of returns to capital
with the returns on broad stock market indices. In this subsection, we restrict the set
of assets available to hedge human capital to include only publicly traded stocks, since
we consider this as being the relevant case for most households. The innovations to
human capital compensation are estimated as in the previous subsections.
Table 7 reports the correlations between the returns to human capital and returns
to the stock market. Since the correlation between U.S. human capital innovations
and stock returns plays a key role in the model calibration presented in Section II, for
the United States we use three diﬀerent stock indices: the Fama and French (1992)
benchmark market return,21 the S&P 500 index, and the Dow Jones Industrial index.
Overall, the table suggests that domestic returns to human capital are in general
more correlated with foreign stock markets: for all countries considered, the asset with
the highest correlation with human capital returns is always a foreign asset. Moreover,
in the United States in particular, returns to human capital have the lowest correlation
with the domestic, rather than the foreign, stock market index. However, the estimated
correlations tend to be quantitatively small (this is consistent with the ﬁndings of Fama
and Schwert (1977)), and the uncertainty attached to the estimation of human capital
21This is a very broad index that covers includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ﬁrms and is avail-
able from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
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delivers large conﬁdence intervals (in particular, only one of the estimated correlation
coeﬃcients is diﬀerent from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level). Nevertheless, as shown
in Table A4 of Appendix A.4, despite the large conﬁdence intervals, the pattern of
lower correlation of human capital with domestic, rather than foreign, returns, is quite
robust to alternative construction of the data.
Table 7: Correlation of Factor Returns Using Stock Market Data
rGL r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L
rGK 0.118
[−0.08,0.24]
0.138
[−0.8,0.24]
0.110
[−0.07,0.26]
0.145
[−0.04,0.27]
rJK 0.122
[−0.05,0.21]
0.071
[−0.09,0.19]
0.145
[−0.02,0.23]
0.194
[0.03,0.26]
rUKK 0.130
[−0.09,0.26]
0.105
[−0.12,0.23]
0.101
[−0.10,0.27]
0.149
[−0.06,0.29]
rUSAFF 0.000
[−0.14,0.11]
−0.088
[−0.20,0.04]
0.031
[−0.10,0.15]
0.041
[−0.10,0.14]
rUSADJ −0.017
[−0.18,0.12]
−0.147
[−0.27,0.01]
0.035
[−0.07,0.21]
0.006
[−0.10,0.18]
rUSASP 0.026
[−0.11,0.12]
−0.076
[−0.19,0.05]
0.075
[−0.05,0.17]
0.070
[−0.06,0.16]
Note: Correlations of human capital returns with physical capital returns. Returns to human capital
are estimated using a VAR speciﬁcation in levels with two lags. Returns on physical capital are
computed using stock market data (CDAX for Germany; Nikko Securities Composite for Japan; FTSE
All-Share Index for United Kingdom; Fama and French (FF), S&P 500 Total Return Index (SP), and
Dow Jones Industrials Total Return Index (DJ) for the United States). We report in brackets the
95% conﬁdence interval constructed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based
on 10,000 replications.
The small correlations in the tables have two important implications. First, when
focusing on tradable claims to physical capital, the assumption of complete spanning
for human capital return used in the previous literature seems to be unsupported by
the data. Second, if one were to use a value weighted approach for the determination
of optimal portfolios as in Baxter and Jermann (1997), the eﬀect of human capital
hedging would be very small, but it would tend to skew holdings in favor of domestic
assets, as shown in Table A5 in Appendix A.5.
Nevertheless, as we have shown in Section II, in the presence of borrowing con-
straints and both aggregate and idiosyncratic human capital risk, even the above small
correlations can have a very large impact on optimal portfolio decisions.
IV Rent Shifting Shocks and the Home Country Bias
The empirical results obtained in the previous section stand in sharp contrast with
the canonical intuition that, in a competitive and frictionless world with constant
labor and capital income shares, payoﬀs to domestic capital and labor are perfectly
correlated. Therefore, if outputs are not perfectly correlated across countries, human
capital hedging should skew domestic portfolios toward foreign assets. In this section,
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we present a stylized calibration exercise and show that, once the degree of international
economic integration observed in the data is accounted for, very small redistributive
shocks are suﬃcient to reverse this conclusion: that is, we show that the canonical
intuition is theoretically fragile.
Consider a simple two-country setting. The domestic output is produced by a
constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with constant elasticity of
output to capital and labor inputs—denoted respectively as α and 1−α. Assume also
that there are additive redistributive shocks (η) to factor remuneration—that is labor
and capital compensation are given, respectively, by
w = (1− α) y + η
rk = αy − η
where y denotes domestic output per capita, w is the domestic wage rate, r is the
return on capital, k is the per capita stock of capital, and for simplicity of exposition
the redistributive shock η is assumed to be a mean zero iid stochastic process.22
Without loss of generality, assume that σ2η = κσ
2
y , i.e. κ measures the ratio between
the variance of the redistributive shock (σ2η) and the per capita output variance (σ
2
y).
Assume also that the foreign economy is characterized by the same structure as the
domestic economy, with σ2y = σ
2
yf
, κf = κ, and αf = α, where the superscript f
denotes quantities in the foreign country. Denote with δ = corr
(
y, yf
)
the correlation
between domestic and foreign output (yf ). It then follows that
corr (w, rk) =
(1− α)α− κ√
(α2 + κ)
[
(1− α)2 + κ
]
corr
(
w, rfkf
)
=
(1− α)α√
(α2 + κ)
[
(1− α)2 + κ
]δ
22Many kinds of shocks are expected to have an eﬀect on the dynamics of income distribution.
Common examples are political business cycles and changes in the bargaining power of unions relative
to ﬁrms. Among others, the works of Bertola (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) suggest that
changes in the time patterns of capital and labor returns may be the endogenous outcome of majority
voting. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) ﬁnd that in the United States the average excess returns on
the stock market are signiﬁcantly higher under Democratic than Republican presidents. Moreover, if
nominal wages and prices have diﬀerent degrees of stickiness, demand and technological shocks will
have redistributive eﬀects on real payoﬀs to labor and capital. Supportive evidence for redistributive
shocks can be found in the empirical literature: Abowd (1989), in a study on wage bargaining in the
United States, ﬁnds a large and negative correlation between unexpected union wage changes and
unexpected changes in the stock value of the ﬁrm; Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) provide
evidence of a negative correlation between wage and proﬁts rates in many OECD countries; Lustig
and Nieuwerburgh (2008) uncover a negative correlation between innovations to human and physical
capital returns in the United States; Gali (1999), Rotemberg (2003), and Francis and Ramey (2009)
document a negative correlation between labor hours and productivity conditioning on productivity
shock.
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where rfkf is the payout to capital invested in the foreign country, implying that
sign
(
corr (w, rk)− corr
(
w, rfkf
))
= sign ((1− α)α (1− δ)− κ) .
This simple observations implies that for suﬃciently high volatility of the redistributive
shock relative to output volatility—i.e., for suﬃciently high κ—the domestic asset
becomes a better hedge for human capital than the foreign asset. Moreover, this
eﬀect becomes stronger when the correlation between domestic and foreign output (δ)
increases. The relevant question is whether unrealistically large redistributive shocks
and cross-country output correlations are needed for this eﬀect to arise.
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Figure 5: Correlations of domestic wage and: domestic (solid line) and foreign (dashed
and dotted lines) capital compensation for diﬀerent levels of international GDP corre-
lation (δ).
Calibrating the capital share of output as α = .3, Figure 5 plots the correlation
between domestic labor income and domestic capital income (solid line), and the cor-
relation of domestic labor income with foreign capital income (for diﬀerent values of
δ in the dashed and dotted lines) as a function of κ (the ratio of the redistributive
shocks variance to output variance). The two values of δ considered are the minimum
and maximum correlations between domestic output and world output reported in
Obsfteld and Rogoﬀ (1996, page 291) for Germany, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Japan.23 The ﬁgure shows that a redistributive shock with a variance that
is a mere 6% (11%) of output variance is enough to make the domestic asset a better
23Using an extended sample that runs until 2012, we ﬁnd much higher correlations, hence the
calibration reported in the ﬁgure is conservative.
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hedge for human capital than the foreign asset when the correlation between domestic
and foreign output, δ, is 0.7 (0.46). That is, relatively small redistributive shocks are
suﬃcient to revert the intuition that, in a Cobb-Douglas world, hedging labor income
risk should skew domestic portfolios toward domestic assets. A natural question is
whether redistributive shocks of this magnitude are realistic. A simple way to gauge
the magnitude of κ is to compute the ratio of i) the variance of the residual of a lin-
ear regression of de-trended labor income on de-trended output, to ii) the variance of
de-trended output. Such an estimate delivers a value for κ in the four countries con-
sidered in our empirical analysis (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Germany during the 1960–2012 period)24 that ranges from 0.06 to 0.48, when using
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) de-trending, and from 0.09 to 0.18 when using linear de-
trending. That is, these estimates are in the range needed to skew portfolio holdings
toward domestic assets.25 Moreover, in the presence of rent shifting shocks, we would
expect to observe time variation in the labor share of income. Figure 6 plots the labor
income share in total output in the four countries considered in our empirical analysis.
The ﬁgure shows substantial time variation in the share of GDP received by the labor
force.
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Figure 6: Labor share of income in Germany, Japan, UK and USA
Note also that the patterns in Figure 6, from the late seventies onward, show a
24A detailed description of the data used throughout the paper is reported in Appendix A.1.
25We ﬁnd very similar results if we gauge the magnitude of κ by computing the ratio of i) the
variance of the residual of a linear regression of de-trended capital income on de-trended output, to ii)
the variance of de-trend output.
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negative trend in the labor share consistent with the ﬁndings of Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2013). These author study a large cross-section of countries and document
that the global labor share has signiﬁcantly declined since the early 1980s, with the
decline occurring within the large majority of countries and industries, and with a
5 percentage point global decline in the labor share since the late seventies—i.e. a
substantial redistribution of income from labor to capital.
V Conclusion
This paper shows that human capital risk can help rationalize the home country bias
in equity holdings at both the aggregate and household levels. First, we show that the
theoretical intuition that short positions in domestic physical assets are a good hedge
for human capital risk is a very fragile one, as very small redistributive shocks—e.g.,
with a variance of a mere 6% of GDP variance—are enough to reverse this intuition.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the presence of this type of shocks is supported by the data.
Second, we show that the commonly used approach of estimating country-speciﬁc
VARs to compute returns to human and physical capital is rejected by the data and
delivers mechanically biased estimates of the hedging beneﬁts of shorting the domes-
tic capital. Most importantly, we show that this misspeciﬁcation largely drives the
ﬁndings of Baxter and Jermann (1997)—i.e., the result that the home bias puzzle is
unequivocally worse than we think once we consider human capital risk, is the outcome
of an econometric misspeciﬁcation strongly rejected by the data.
Moreover, we show that when returns to physical capital are measured using broad
stock market indexes, human capital return innovations tend to be more correlated
with foreign rather than domestic stocks. Nevertheless, these correlations are small
and, consequently, in a frictionless complete market setting, have very little impact on
optimal portfolios.
Fourth, calibrating a buﬀer stock saving model consistent with both micro and
macro labor income dynamics—hence taking into account that individual labor income
uncertainty is substantially larger than the aggregate one— as well as stock market
data, we show that a large home country bias arises as an equilibrium result. This
is due to the fact that household labor income risk is about one order of magnitude
larger than aggregate labor income risk and, in the presence of liquidity constraints,
optimal hedging becomes heavily skewed toward the asset whose innovations have the
lowest correlation with the labor income innovations—the domestic asset.
Moreover, our heterogenous agents model implies that, at the household level, the
degree of home country bias should increase (and portfolio diversiﬁcation decrease)
in the labor income to ﬁnancial wealth ratio—and this is exactly the novel empirical
stylized fact that we uncover in the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances data.
Our ﬁndings should not be interpreted as an alternative to other rationalization of
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the home country bias in portfolio holdings (see, e.g., Engel and Matsumoto (2009),
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), and Heathcote and Perri (2013)) but rather
complementary.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Description
In order to allow for a direct comparison of our results with the results of Baxter and
Jermann (1997), we collect annual data on labor income and capital income from the
OECD National Accounts for Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The data for the period from 1960 to 2003 are available through ESDS International
(http://www.esds.ac.uk). More recent data (i.e., data for the period from 1970
to 2012) are available directly from the OECD’s iLibrary (http://stats.oecd.org/).
Our measure of labor income is total employee compensation paid by resident producers
(Table 3, number 1). Our measure of capital income is GDP at factor cost (Table 3,
number 18) minus employee compensation.
This leaves us with two overlapping datasets that need to be spliced to cover the full
sample period from 1960 to 2012. Unfortunately, the calculation standards for GDP
have changed over time and are thus slightly diﬀerent for the two datasets. Therefore,
we cannot simply append more recent data to the older dataset, so we use the ratio
of GDP for one dataset in the year in which we splice the data to GDP for the other
dataset as a conversion rate. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we augment the dataset
from 1960 until 2003 with more recent data that is adjusted using the GDP ratio for
the year 2003 as a conversion rate. Section A.4 discusses the robustness of our results
with respect to the construction of the labor and capital income data series.
Finally, the OECD National Accounts database for Germany refers to data for the
whole of Germany prior to the German reuniﬁcation, using the ratio of GDP for West
Germany to GDP for Germany as a whole in 1991 as a conversion rate. Hence, to
better take into account the legal barriers to international investments faced by East
Germans prior to 1990, we construct labor and capital income series for West Germany
only by employing data from the German Statistical Oﬃce (http://www.vgrdl.de/
Arbeitskreis_VGR).
The summary statistics of the labor and capital income series are reported in Table
A1. The sample averages of the labor shares of income reported in the table are the
values for αj used in Equation (17).
We retrieve the following stock market data from the Global Financial Data (https:
//www.globalfinancialdata.com): CDAX Total Return Index for Germany, Nikko
Securities Composite Total Return for Japan, FTSE All-Share Return Index for the
United Kingdom, and S&P 500 Total Return Index and Dow Jones Industrials Total
Return Index (DJ) for the United States. The Fama and French benchmark return for
the United States (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html) is given by the sum of the Fama and French excess market return
and the risk-free rate.
In order to construct real per capita returns, we collect population and GDP ﬁg-
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ures deﬂator from the International Financial Statistics service of the International
Monetary Fund (available through http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/).
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Labor Income Capital Income Labor Share
Germany Mean 190943 170547 0.530
(millions of euros) Std. Deviation 62059 63631 0.029
Japan Mean 154322 121685 0.508
(billions of yen) Std. Deviation 62670 46028 0.047
U.K. Mean 70719 53747 0.573
(millions of pounds) Std. Deviation 19304 18160 0.025
U.S. Mean 150265 109329 0.580
(millions of dollars) Std. Deviation 43485 34474 0.011
Note: The sample period is 1960–2012.
Survey of Consumer Finances data and the corresponding codebooks are avail-
able from the Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/
scfindex.htm). Data was collected for 8 diﬀerent surveys from 1992 to 2013. The
questionnaires are slightly diﬀerent for diﬀerent years. The questions regarding foreign
stock holdings, however, remain the same over time. Figure A1 shows the results of lo-
cally weighted regressions of the share of foreign assets on the logarithm of normalized
ﬁnancial wealth, i.e. ﬁnancial wealth divided by a household’s labor income.
A.2 Cointegration Analysis
In this Appendix, we provide a battery of econometric tests on the time series properties
of labor and capital income in the four countries in our sample.
Since both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller (1981)) and the Phillips-
Perron (Phillips and Perron (1988)) tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit roots
in labor and capital income (results not reported but available upon request), we inves-
tigate whether the logarithm of labor income shares a common stochastic trend with
the logarithm of capital income, thus implying the existence of a pairwise cointegration
relationship within each country.
Table A2 presents econometric evidence based on the Johansen cointegration test
(Johansen (1995)), in which we allow for a linear deterministic trend in the data and
an intercept (but not a trend) in the cointegration vector. For each country, the table
reports both the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics for diﬀerent
lags speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst diﬀerenced terms. The last column of Table A2 tests the
restriction that the log ratio of labor income to capital income is stationary, i.e., the
log of labor income and the log of capital income are cointegrated with cointegrating
vector [1,−1].
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Figure A1: Locally weighted regressions of the share of foreign assets on the logarithm
of ﬁnancial wealth divided by a household’s labor income for diﬀerent years of the U.S.
Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table A2: Johansen Cointegration Test
Country Number of Lags Trace Max Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio
Germany 0 20.22
(0.009)
19.80
(0.006)
15.32
(0.002)
1 11.377
(0.190)
9.504
(0.272)
7.196
(0.007)
2 10.159
(0.302)
8.59
(0.370)
6.39
(0.012)
3 10.48
(0.270)
8.34
(0.396)
5.49
(0.019)
Japan 0 54.96
(0.001)
51.84
(0.001)
4.36
(0.037)
1 27.42
(0.001)
22.86
(0.002)
3.70
(0.055)
2 17.40
(0.026)
12.06
(0.109)
4.37
(0.037)
3 30.04
(0.001)
26.04
(0.01)
19.83
(0.000)
United Kingdom 0 18.63
(0.016)
17.46
(0.015)
13.58
(0.000)
1 12.41
(0.0139)
9.91
(0.229)
4.98
(0.026)
2 11.30
(0.194)
8.39
(0.391)
5.23
(0.022)
3 12.30
(0.143)
10.48
(0.183)
7.62
(0.006)
United States 0 16.53
(0.035)
15.85
(0.028)
12.96
(0.000)
1 12.28
(0.144)
10.61
(0.175)
8.76
(0.003)
2 13.43
(0.100)
8.88
(0.339)
3.87
(0.049)
3 15.53
(0.049)
10.53
(0.180)
5.51
(0.019)
Note: Johansen cointegration test. The null hypothesis is no pairwise cointegration between labor
income and capital income within each country. We report the trace and maximum eigenvalue test
statistics for diﬀerent lag speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst diﬀerenced terms. The last column tests the restric-
tion that the log ratio of labor income to capital income is stationary, i.e., the log of labor income and
the log of capital income are cointegrated with cointegrating vector [1,−1]. We report the p-value of
the test statistics in parentheses.
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The null hypothesis of no cointegration between labor and capital income cannot be
generally rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels for all countries but Japan. Hence, the
long-run restriction suggested by Baxter and Jermann (1997) of pairwise cointegration
within countries is not supported by the data unless the number of lags in the test
equation is zero. The sensitivity of the result to the lag speciﬁcation can be due to the
low power of the cointegration test, stemming perhaps from a small sample size.
In Figure A2 we plot the log ratio of labor income to capital income in the four
countries in our sample. Simple visual inspection suggests that the behavior of the log
ratio of labor income to capital income is not stationary. Indeed, as reported in the last
column of Table A2, a formal testing procedure based on the Johansen cointegrating
test strongly rejects the cointegration restriction for all countries.
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Figure A2: Log ratio of labor income to capital income in Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
We acknowledge that if labor and capital income are allowed to have independent
trends, then the ratio of labor income to capital income either will grow without bound
or approach zero asymptotically. Therefore, labor’s share will approach one or zero
with probability one. However, it is important to realize that the cointegration tests
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are simply rejecting the hypothesis about the existence of a pairwise cointegration
relationship within each country, but it is completely silent about the existence of a
long-run equilibrium relationship across countries. Moreover, since in this paper we do
our econometric analysis in levels, we allow for implicit cointegrating relationships in
the data.
A.3 Estimation of the Aggregate Labor Income Process
In order to model the U.S. labor income process, we experimented with several speci-
ﬁcations in the ARIMA class and performed the standard set of Box-Jenkins selection
procedures. In particular, among the models considered, MA(2) and ARMA(1,1) pro-
cesses ﬁt well to ﬁrst diﬀerences of log labor income. Since these speciﬁcations deliver
similar results, we henceforth restrict attention to the ARIMA(0,1,2) speciﬁcation for
log income since it simpliﬁes the exposition and it has previously been used in the
literature in similar contexts (see, e.g., Davis and Willen (2000) and MaCurdy (1982)).
Thus, the ﬁtted earning speciﬁcation is the MA(2) process in equation (2). The esti-
mated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A3 below.
Table A3: Estimated Labor Income Process
μˆy ϑˆ1 ϑˆ2 st. error of ˆ
0.0188 0.4475 0.0937 0.0214
(0.0045) (0.1501) (0.1556)
Note: Newey-West standard errors reported in brackets.
A.4 Robustness of Factor Returns Correlations
This section tests whether the correlation of the factor returns presented in Table 7
are sensitive to the way we construct our data series on labor income. As mentioned in
Section A.1, our ﬁnal data of labor and capital income stems from two diﬀerent datasets
that are then combined. An immediate concern is whether the results of this paper are
robust to the diﬀerent possible ways of combining the two datasets. In particular, one
could think of four diﬀerent ways of combining them: 1) augment the 1960-2003 dataset
from 2003 onwards (baseline speciﬁcation); 2) augment the 1960-2003 dataset from
1970 onwards; 3) augment the 1970-2012 dataset from 2003 backwards; 4) augment
the 1970-2012 datset from 1970 backwards. We opt for the ﬁrst alternative for several
reasons. First, we choose to augment the 1960-2003 dataset since this maximizes the
overlap with the data Baxter and Jermann (1997) used in their analysis. Second, we
decide to splice the datasets in the year 2003 because at that time Germany had already
reuniﬁed and the data is thus consistent. Nevertheless, we explore the robustness of
our results by comparing them for the four diﬀerent alternatives.
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In Table A4, we recalculate Table 7 for the four alternatives. The results for alter-
natives 1) to 4) are reported clockwise, with the top left part being identical to Table
A5—our baseline speciﬁcation. The results suggest that, keeping the year in which we
splice ﬁxed, there is essentially no diﬀerence in the correlations whether we extend the
1960-2003 or the 1970-2012 dataset. This can be seen from comparing the correlations
vertically across tables. From a horizontal comparison accross tables, however, one
can see that the choice of the year in which we splice the datasets matters to some
extent. Nevertheless, the main result of the table, which is key for this paper, remains
unchanged: the ordering of the correlations of the diﬀerent stock market returns with
the U.S. labor returns. Even though the numbers change, it is still true that this
correlation is largest for Japan, followed by the United Kingdom, and Germany; most
importantly, it is the lowest for the United States.
A.5 Hedging Human Capital in a Frictionless Complete Market
.
The correlation structure between physical and human capital returns reported in
Table 6 is not suﬃcient to identify the hedging behaviour without additional assump-
tions on the structure of the economy. In the main body of the paper, we provide a
model of human capital hedging that accounts for both idiosyncratic and aggregate
labor income risk, as well as liquidity constraints and market incompleteness. But in
this subsection, we want to show that the VAR misspeciﬁcation is the main driver
behind the empirical results on human capital hedging reported in the previous liter-
ature. Moreover, we want to show that the estimates are characterized by substantial
uncertainty, making the conclusion of human capital pushing toward overinvestment
in foreign assets very far fetched. To show this, we now assume—only for this sub-
section—that the set of international risky ﬁnancial assets provides perfect spanning
for human capital as in Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) and Baxter and
Jermann (1997). In other words, we assume that there exists a linear combination of
domestic and foreign marketable assets that is perfectly correlated with the return to
domestic human capital returns.
Assuming complete spanning of human capital returns by the stock market returns
(as in Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) and Baxter and Jermann (1997)),
one can compute hedge portfolios for human capital risk via simple linear projection.
Each hedge portfolio is chosen such that it hedges $1.00 of human capital income ﬂow.
Let hjk be the weight of the risky ﬁnancial asset of country k in the hedge portfolio of
country j residents. The hedge portfolio of country j, hj := [hj1, hj2, ..., hjK ]
′, is given
given by
hj = Σ
−1Ωj (16)
where Σ is the K×K covariance matrix of returns on risky ﬁnancial assets in the world
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portfolio, and Ωj is the K × 1 vector of covariances of ﬁnancial assets returns with the
human capital return of country j. Notice that since the hedge portfolio is constructed
to hedge $1.00 of human capital, there is no reason for the portfolio weights to add to
one.
Moreover, under the complete spanning assumption, one can also compute optimal
portfolios following the value-weighted approach used in Baxter and Jermann (1997).
The value-weighted portfolio approach, without considering the human capital hedging
for the moment, follows from the two funds separation theorem (Merton (1973)): in
a frictionless one-period economy with no asymmetric information, in the presence
of K ﬁnancial risky assets and a risk-free asset, all individuals will hold a portfolio
given by a linear combination of the risk free asset and the market portfolio—i.e.,
the value-weighted portfolio. As a consequence, the risky part of each individual’s
portfolio will have a composition identical to the market portfolio. The extension of
this approach to our international framework is straightforward: in equilibrium each
investor, independent of his nationality, will hold a risky portfolio with a composition
identical to the world portfolio of risky ﬁnancial assets, i.e., each country’s asset will
be in the portfolio with a share equal to the share of the country in the world portfolio
of marketable risky assets. That is, denoting with πk the fraction of country k risky
marketable asset in the world portfolio, we have that in the absence of human capital
risk, πk would be the share of country k asset in the portfolio of risky ﬁnancial assets
of each country.
In the presence of non-marketable human capital, portfolio holdings will be adjusted
due to the hedging motive. Therefore, the portfolio of risky assets held by a country
j individual will depend also on the covariance of domestic returns to human capital
and (domestic and foreign) returns to physical capital. In particular, to hedge the
human capital risk, the net demand by a resident of country j for the asset of country
k expressed as a fraction of the home country (country j) portfolio of ﬁnancial assets
will be
πk
[
1 +
1− αj
αj
(
4∑
k=1
hjk
)]
− 1− αj
αj
hjk, (17)
where 1− αj is the labor share of income in country j.
The last term in Equation (17) is the share of country k marketable asset that has
to be sold to hedge the human capital risk in country j. The expression multiplying πk
reﬂects the funds generated by selling the investor’s endowment of the claim to domestic
physical capital and the portfolio that hedges the risks associated with human capital
wealth, i.e.,
1−αj
αj
(∑4
k=1 hjk
)
.
The value weighted optimal portfolios implied by the correlations between human
and physical capital returns in Table 7 are reported in Table A5. Panel A focuses on
the VAR and national accounts based estimates of physical capital returns, while Panel
B use stock market index returns.
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Table A5: Value-Weighted Diversiﬁed Portfolio with Complete Markets
Shares in each country traded asset:
Investor Nationality: Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Panel A: rk measured from VAR and national accounts
Germany −0.225
[−0.76,0.55]
0.060
−0.28,0.31]
1.576
[0.64,2.16]
−0.411
[−1.21,0.62]
Japan 0.742
[−0.19,1.76]
−0.606
[−1.08,−0.21]
1.882
[0.63,2.84]
−1.017
[−2.22,0.51]
UK 0.230
[−0.56,1.17]
1.059
[0.53,1.34]
1.191
[−0.08,2.02]
−1.480
[−2.50,0.08]
USA 0.019
[−0.52,0.91]
0.054
[0.11,0.78]
0.786
[−0.30,1.41]
−0.341
[−1.23,0.87]
Panel B: rk measured using stock market returns
Germany 0.040
[0.04,0.05]
0.289
[0.28,0.29]
0.145
[0.14,0.16]
0.526
[0.51,0.53]
Japan 0.034
[0.03,0.04]
0.290
[0.28,0.29]
0.139
[0.13,0.15]
0.537
[0.52,0.54]
UK 0.039
[0.03,0.05]
0.287
[0.28,0.29]
0.147
[0.14,0.17]
0.527
[0.5,0.53]
USA 0.039
[0.03,0.05]
0.287
[0.28,0.29]
0.145
[0.14,0.17]
0.530
[0.51,0.54]
World share 0.043 0.293 0.150 0.516
Note: Diversiﬁed portfolio using stock market returns (CDAX for Germany, Nikko Securities Compos-
ite for Japan, FTSE All-Share Index for the United Kingdom, and Fama and French for the United
States). Each cell displays the net demand by a resident of country j for the assets of country k
expressed as a fraction of home country (country j) marketable assets. We report in brackets the
95% conﬁdence interval constructed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based
on 10,000 replications.
Panel A shows that, after correcting the VAR misspeciﬁcation, the Baxter and
Jermann (1997) value-weighted approach leads to inconclusive results concerning the
role of human capital for optimal portfolio diversiﬁcation: large home bias is basically
as likely as large shorting of the domestic market.
Comparing the optimal in portfolios in Panel B with the (rescaled to sum up to
one) world shares (πk) of the various countries’ stock markets in the world market
capitalization reported in the last row, the table shows that the inclusion of human
capital hedging motive has basically no eﬀect when the space of tradable claims to
capital is the one of publicly traded companies.
A.6 A Counterfactual Calibration
This section shows that the results presented in Section II.2 are almost entirely driven
by the relative ordering of correlations between labor income innovations and market
returns, rather than the particular point estimates.
To stress this point, we perform a counterfactual calibration of the model. First,
to focus only on the eﬀect of the correlations of labor income and asset returns, we
calibrate the between assets correlation to be all equal to .5. Second, we consider four
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assets that have equally spaced positive correlations with labor income innovations
that range from 0.0 to 0.15.
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Figure A3: Optimal consumption and investment policy functions as a function of the
normalized cash-on-hand.
Optimal policy functions of this counterfactual exercise are reported in Figure ??.
When the agent enters the saving region, she starts investing only in the asset with the
lowest correlation with aggregate labor income shocks. Only at higher levels of liquid
wealth to labor income ratios does the agent start to diversify her portfolio, adding
stocks one at a time. Moreover, the order in which the agent starts investing in the
diﬀerent stocks matches the inverse rank of the correlations between labor income and
asset returns. As a consequence, the optimal portfolio shares reported in Figure A4
are heavily skewed toward the asset with the lowest correlation.
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Figure A4: Optimal portfolio shares as a function of normalized cash-on-hand.
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